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Cracks	are	beginning	to	appear	in	British-Irish
relations
Since	the	Brexit	referendum,	policy-makers’	and	academics’	attention	has	increasingly	focused
on	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	border	in	Ireland,	specifically	on	the	impact	of	a	‘hard’	border.	The
border	issue	is	obviously	highly	significant	economically	and	politically	and	deserves	attention.
But,	as	argued	by	Etain	Tannam	from	Trinity	College	Dublin,	the	fundamental	importance	of	the
British-Irish	relationship	is	at	least	as	important	and	in	2017	cracks	are	beginning	to	appear	in
that	relationship.
The	core	principles	of	the	British-Irish	intergovernmental	framework	date	back	to	the	signing	of	the	Anglo-Irish
Agreement		(AIA)	in	1985.	Until	1985,	British-Irish	relations	were	typified	by	megaphone	diplomacy.	In	the	early
1980s,	UK	and	Irish	prime	ministers	did	not	meet	for	16	months,	disagreeing	vocally	about	the	H-Block	hunger
strikes	and	the	Falklands	War.	Ironically,	Margaret	Thatcher	stereotyped	as	‘not	for	turning’	negotiated	the	AIA	in
1985	with	the	Irish	government.	Although	the	size	of	the	Irish	dimension	did	not	meet	with	Irish	government
expectations,	the	AIA	provided	for	consultation	with	the	Irish	government	over	matters	of	concern	to	the
nationalist	minority	in	Northern	Ireland	and	also	for	institutionalised	intergovernmental	meetings	that	would	occur
every	6	months	at	least.	The	underlying	principle	was	that	in	order	for	peace	to	occur	in	Northern	Ireland,
nationalists	and	unionists	must	feel	their	rights	were	guaranteed	by	their	kinship	states-Ireland	and	the	UK	and
that	both	governments	must	be	obliged	to	meet	regularly	to	iron	out	differences	privately,	particularly	in	a	crisis.
Being	an	honest	broker	or	guarantor	did	not	mean	taking	sides	with	unionism	or	nationalism,	but	that	both
governments	would	alert	each	other	to	any	apparent	injustices	and	work	to	an	agreement.	The	lesson	of	the
doomed	1973	Sunningdale	Agreement	was	that	only	strong	elite	leadership	from	both	governments	with
centralised	executive	control	and	strong	intergovernmental	coordination	could	forge	a	peace	agreement	and	that
the	peace	process	would	be	a	gradual	one.
Taoiseach	Garret	FitzGerald	and	prime	minister	Margaret	Thatcher.	Image	by	Danny	Morrison,	licenced	under	CC	BY-SA	2.0.
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The	roots	of	the	approach	lay	with	a	core	team	of	UK	and	Irish	civil	servants	and	also	with	the	lobbying	efforts	of
John	Hume,	then	leader	of	the	Social	Democratic	and	Labour	Party	(SDLP).	Many	of	the	core	ideas	were
adopted	first	by	Irish	governments	from	the	mid	1970s	but	were	initially	opposed	by	UK	governments	on	the
grounds	that	any	Irish	input	eroded	UK	sovereignty.	EU	membership	contributed	to	a	less	absolutist	definition	of
sovereignty	among	UK	elites,	but	fundamentally	the	IRA’s	bombing	campaign	and	the	decision	of	Republican
leadership	to	enter	democratic	politics	in	Northern	Ireland	in	1981	(the	policy	of	the	‘armalite	and	the	ballot
box’)	threatened	to	destabilise	both	Irish	and	UK	states.	The	AIA	and	British-Irish	intergovernmentalism	were	a
response	to	the	burgeoning	crisis.	Initially,	Margaret	Thatcher	refused	to	alter	traditional	UK	government	policy,
but	following	the	Brighton	bombing	in	1984	and	following	advice	from	1st	Secretary,	Sir	Robert	Armstrong,	she
agreed	to	the	new	approach.
Throughout	the	1990s,	two	principles	governed	British-Irish	cooperation:	both	governments	were	honest	brokers
and	both	governments	consulted	privately	and	agreed	on	a	joint	position.	Senior	civil	servants	observed	how
gradually	both	governments	made	policy	together	consensually	–	‘joined	up	‘	thinking	and	joint	problem-solving
typified	the	relationship.	Since	the	mid-1980s,	frequent	high-level	British-Irish	communication	has	occurred.	Joint
policy	formulation	and	an	emphasis	on	Northern	Ireland	as	a	discrete	UK	policy	area	have	been	the	hallmarks	of
the	British-Irish	relationship.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	early	1980s	and	the	1970s,	in	the	1990s,	despite	the	various
crises	in	Northern	Ireland	and	despite	violence,	there	was	no	megaphone	diplomacy	and	British	and	Irish
governments	responded	jointly	to	each	crisis.
Symbolising	the	close	relationship,	Queen	Elizabeth	made	a	state	visit	to	Ireland	in	2011	–	the	first	time	a	British
monarch	had	visited	Ireland	in	a	century.	Another	sign	of	cooperation	was	that	the	Irish	government	briefed	the
UK	government	in	planning	its	commemoration	of	the	centenary	of	the	1916	Easter	Rising.	Thus,	since	the	GFA,
British-Irish	cooperation	has	continued	to	thrive.	The	British	government	continued	to	play	the	role	of	honest
broker	in	the	Agreement,	not	serving	unionism’s	interests,	unless	there	was	agreement	with	the	Irish	government
in	advance.	There	were	clear	informal	and	formal	rules	of	the	game	in	British-Irish	relationship
Given	the	centrality	of	the	Britsh-Irish	relationship	to	the	peace	process,	a	weakening	of	cooperation	is	arguably
the	biggest	threat	to	peace	and	stability,	as	without	cooperation,	chances	of	a	hard	border	increase	even	more
and	chances	of	managing	any	new	border	arrangments	and	of	helping	to	sustain	Northern	Ireland’s	fragile	peace,
decline	drastically.	Unfortunately,	Brexit	and	its	fallout	in	UK	politics	have	created	pressures	that	were
unimaginable	20	years	ago	and	those	pressures	are	causing	cracks	in	the	relationship.	The	core	principles	of
being	an	honest	broker	and	of	Irish	and	UK	governments	agreeing	on	joint	positions	consensually	appear	to	be
weaker.
Brexit	has	created	an	immediate	conflict	of	interest	for	the	Irish	government
By	entering	into	a	confidence	and	supply	arrangement	with	the	DUP,	the	Conservative	Party	threatens	a
nonpartisan	approach,	viewed	as	a	crucial	confidence-building	measure	in	any	conflict,	or	post-conflict	situation.
Such	a	stark	move	of	key	relevance	to	Northern	Irish	politics	is	at	odds	with	the	normative	framework	of	British-
Irish	relations.	In	addition,	Brexit	has	created	an	immediate	conflict	of	interest	for	the	Irish	government.	As	an	EU
partner,	it	must	tow	the	EU-line	in	EU-UK	Brexit	negotiations	and	not	be	seen	to	ally	itself	with	the	UK,	regardless
of	how	much	it	wants	a	free	trade	arrangement	with	the	UK.
Overall,	Brexit	tests	British-Irish	cooperation	in	a	number	of	other	ways,	not	always	related	to	Northern	Ireland
politics,	but	nevertheless	potentially	stressful	to	the	relationship	and	with	potential	to	spill	over.	Firstly,	the
complexity	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	means	that	both	administrations,	but	particularly	the	UK	administration,	are
over-burdened	and	face	a	multitude	of	highly	complex	bargaining	issues.	For	the	Irish	government,	Northern
Ireland	is	a	key	bargaining	priority,	but	for	the	UK	there	are	many	priorities,	as	well	as	the	need	to	negotiate
deeper	links	with	non-EU	states.	Thus,	Northern	Ireland,	given	that	it	is	relatively	stable	currently,	may	slip	off	the
UK	agenda.	In	addition,	the	UK	civil	service	has	suffered	upheaval	because	of	Brexit	and	some	staff	with	whom
Irish	civil	servants	had	built	close	relationships	have	been	moved	to	the	new	Department	for	Exiting	the	EU
(DexEU),	adding	to	pressures	in	the	Irish	external	policy-making	environment.
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Even	before	Brexit	and	under	various	UK	prime	ministers,	although	British-Irish	intergovernmental	cooperation
thrived,	UK	government	complacency	about	Northern	Ireland	seemed	to	exist.	For	example,	former	Prime
Minister	David	Cameron	announced	the	referendum	date	as	June	23rd,	despite	unionist	and	nationalist	calls	for	a
different	date	that	would	not	clash	with	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	election	campaign.	Similarly,	neither
Gordon	Brown,	former	Labour	party	leader,	nor	David	Cameron	attended	the	GFA’s	British-Irish	Council
meetings,	but	the	Irish	Taoiseach	always	attended.
The	problem	posed	by	Brexit	is	that	the	less	frequently	the	UK	government	communicates	with	the	Irish
government	in	any	decisions	of	relevance	to	Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland	and	the	more	it	appears	to	discount
Northern	Ireland’s	post-conflict	status,	the	more	tension	is	brought	to	bare	on	the	British-Irish	relationship.	To
date,	any	potential	tensions	have	been	managed	smoothly,	but	it	is	noteworthy	that	in	April	2017,	the	then	Irish
Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	in	Ireland,	Charlie	O’Flanagan,	openly	criticised	the	UK	government	for	not
engaging	properly	with	the	EU	in	Brexit	negotiations	and	for	not	communicating	adequately	with	the	Irish
government.	This	public,	albeit	tame,	criticism	marked	a	break	with	the	recent	history	of	British-Irish	relations	and
reflected	the	Irish	government’s	wish	to	negotiate	as	an	EU	partner	and	not	to	take	sides	with	the	UK.	Again,
unusually,	in	recent	British-Irish	intergovernmental	history,	after	the	UK	June	election,	the	new	Irish	Prime
Minister,	Leo	Varadkar	reminded	the	UK	government	that	both	governments	had	a	legal	obligation,	to	be	honest
brokers	under	the	GFA.	Again,	unusually,	the	UK	government	announced	that	it	was	considering	revoking	the
1964	London	Fisheries	Convention	that	allowed	Irish	fishing	access	to	UK	waters.	The	Irish	Minister	for
Agriculture,	Michael	Creed	highlighted	the	dangers	to	Irish	fishing,	but	a	few	weeks	later	an	announcement
was	made	through	the	British	Embassy	in	Dublin	that	the	UK	was	leaving	the	Convention.	Indeed,	according	to
Michael	Creed,	he	only	found	out	about	the	decision	through	media	channels.	Not	only	the	decision,	but	the
manner	by	which	it	was	communicated	to	the	Irish	government	marks	a	potentially	serious	break	with	the	past.
Another	example	of	change	is	that	the	new	Irish	Minister	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade,	Simon	Coveney
announced	in	Brussels	that	technical	solutions	to	customs	posts	would	not	work	and	that	more	measures	were
needed	to	prevent	the	creation	of	a	hard	border,	thus	departing	publicly	from	the	UK	position	on	the	Irish	border.
All	these	events	have	occurred	against	the	backdrop	of	growing	Irish	governmental	frustration	about	the	UK’s
Brexit	strategy	and	increased	uncertainty	about	the	final	outcome.	A	decisive	Tory	victory	in	the	June	2017
election	may	have	led	to	a	clearer	approach	to	Northern	Ireland,	but	instead,	the	UK	government’s	weakness	has
exacerbated	tensions.	It	is	also	possible	that	recent	events	in	British-Irish	cooperation	are	a	function	of	the	current
UK	government’s	leadership	style	and	will	subside	when	a	new	government	is	elected.	Nevertheless,	even	short-
term	strains	in	the	British-Irish	relationship	are	best	avoided	and	until	recently,	they	have	been	rare.
British-Irish	intergovernmental	cooperation	was	a	fundamental	cause	of	the
peace	process	in	Northern	Ireland
British-Irish	intergovernmental	cooperation	was	a	fundamental	cause	of	the	peace	process	in	Northern	Ireland.	It
took	over	60	years	to	achieve,	but	it	became	effective	and,	to	date,	it	has	been	extremely	resilient.	However,
there	are	small	cracks	emerging	and	in	these	turbulent	times,	British-Irish	cooperation	should	not	be	taken	for
granted,	nor	its	impact	on	the	peace	process	undervalued.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	
Etain	Tannam	is	Assistant	Professor	in	International	Peace	Studies,	Trinity	College	Dublin	and	Associate	P.I.
Trinity’s	Long	Room	Hub	for	Arts	and	Humanities,	Trinity	College	Dublin.
Brexit’s	implications	for	Northern	Ireland	may	be	destabilising,	but	not	fatal
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